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One Law for All?
The Logic of Cultural Accommodationt
Jeremy Waldron
L
Our belief in the rule of law commits us to the principle that the law
should be the same for everyone: one law for all and no exceptions.' It would
be quite repugnant if there were one law for the rich and another for the poor,
one law for black Americans and another for whites. Formally at least we
repudiate all such classifications, and to the extent they still exist in our law
or in the way our legal system is administered, we believe they disfigure, or
at least pose grave difficulties for, our commitment to the rule of law ideal.
We value this generality not least as a bulwark against oppression. We figure
that we are less likely to get oppressive laws when the lawmakers are bound
by the same rules they lay down for everyone else.2 We are less likely to get
a ban on foreign travel when there is no exemption for legislators or party
members. We are less likely to get a ban on abortion when the laws apply to
the wives and daughters of male legislators as well as to the wives and daugh-
ters of the ordinary citizens.
3
1' 53rd Annual John Randolph Tucker Lecture, delivered at Washington and Lee
University School of Law on October 5, 2001. This is an extract from a paper originally
presented as the first Kadish Lecture at the University of California, Berkeley, on Febnary 23,
2001. That paper, in turn, adapted a preliminary draft of a chapter of a book I am writing
entitled COSMOPOLrrAN Rir (Oxford University Press, eventually). I am grateful to Brian
Barry, Michael Dorf, Kent Greenawalt, Ira Katznelson, Thomas Pogge, Chuck Sabel, Carol
Sanger, Peter Strauss, and other members of Columbia's Fifteen Minute Paper Group, for
comments on earlier - and shorterl - versions of this. Robert Post and Sam Scheffier gave
generous and enormously helpful comments at the Berkeley occasion, and Stephen Sugarman
also gave me some comments afterward; but I have not yet had time to incorporate my response
to those three sets of comments into this version of the paper.
* Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law and
Philosophy, Columbia University, New York.
1. AV. DIcEY, INTRODUCTIONTO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTrrTInON 114
(8th ed. 1915, republished 1982) ("[W]e mean... when we speak of the rule oflaw... that
here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm.").
2. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 154-55 (1960) (arguing that chief
safeguard of liberty is that rules must apply to those who create and enforce them).
3. Indeed, this is one of the reasons we value a representative legislature composed of
ordinary members drawn from the community. "By which means," as John Locke put it, "every
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At the same time, we live in a society in which there are many different
cultures and a bewildering variety of religions and belief systems, each
capable of attributing peculiar significance to the actions and circumstances
in which the law of the land is interested. Two pieces of behavior that look
like the same action may have different meanings for those who perform them.
Two sets of circumstances that seem identical from the point of view of one
culture may look quite different when described in the language of another.
So how do we know when the law is the same for everyone? Is it enough that
it treats the same behavior in the same physical circumstances identically; or
does the rule of law only require that we treat identically pieces of behavior
that have the same significance for those who perform them and, perhaps also,
for those on whom they are performed?
For example, some children get together with an older adult, and he sup-
plies them with alcohol. A priest passes a cup of wine to young communi-
cants. Are these the same action or different actions? A man is found in a
public place with a knife concealed on his person. Is this knife a dangerous
and offensive weapon? Or does it belong to a Sikh, carrying a kirpan, in
fulfillment of religious obligation?
Of course the law can make an exception for the Sikh or for the sacramen-
tal use of wine. Laws have all sorts of exceptions, conditions, and qualifica-
tions.4 Provided they too are stated in general terms and administered impar-
tially, their existence does not violate the principle of the rule of law with
which I began, at least not formally. Still the strategy of exception can some-
times present more difficulties than it is capable of resolving. Brian Barry, in
his new book Culture and Equality, brings up the case of a young man arrested
at a demonstration in Trafalgar Square in 1997, carrying a three-foot-long
double-edged sword.5 When the young man convinced a London court of the
sincerity of his belief that he was King Arthur's twentieth century reincarna-
tion and, as such, the Honored Pendragon of the Glastonbury Order of Druids,
single person became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he
himself, as part of the Legislative, had established: nor could any one, by his own Authority,
avoid the force of the Law, when once made, nor by any pretence of Superiority, plead exemp-
tion, thereby to License his own, or the Miscarriages of any of his Dependents." I1 JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREAISES OF GOVERNMENT 330, ch. vii, 94 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988)(1690).
4. Texas law professor Douglas Laycock has pointed out that your average statute is
riddled with exemptions for all sorts of secular circumstances. If anything, it is the failure to
use ordinary legislative techniques to accommodate religious and cultural difference - on the
scale of lawmakers' normal sensitivity to differences in, say, commercial circumstances - that
is puzzling and perhaps offensive and unfair to cultural and religious minorities. See Douglas
Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 50-51 (arguing that if govern-
ment grants exemptions for secular reasons it must do likewise for religious reasons).
5. BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUAI.TY 51-52 (2001) (quoting Excalibur Regained
asArthur Pulls It Off, TBE GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 1997, at 1).
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the judge found he had no alternative but to give Arthur (as I suppose we
should call him) the benefit of Section 139(5)(b) ofthe Criminal Justice Act of
1988, which provides the following statutory defense to a charge of carrying
in a public place "any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed":
it shall be a defense for a person charged with an offence under this section
to prove that he had the article with him (a) for use at work; (b) for reli-
gious reasons; or (c) as part of any national costume.
The parliamentary record is pretty clear that this defense was enacted for the
benefit of members of the Sikh community, not for the likes of Arthur Uther
Pendragon.6 But of course that is just the sort of thing for which one must not
use legislative intention; one must not use it to turn a very general exception
into one that is focused on the benefit to a particular person or group. One
must follow the general terms of the defense wherever they lead, or else one
has given up on even this modified version of the rule of law. So in this case,
the very terms of the exception laid down in the statute led the judge to dismiss
the charges and order the police to give King Arthur back his Excalibur.
ff.
It is natural to think of the exemption for the use of communion wine
during prohibition 7 - a harmless use (at best a sip and certainly not intoxicat-
ing) - as our model for religious and cultural exemptions. We exempt the
conduct because we can see that it is not really the sort of thing at which the
general prohibition is aimed.
There are interesting cases that conform to this paradigm. My favorite
example is State v. Kargar.8 The state of Maine has a statute that forbids var-
ious forms of sexual contact between adult and child as gross sexual assault (a
felony). Mr. Kargar, an Afghani refugee living in Portland, was seen by a
babysitter kissing the penis of his eighteen month old son. The babysitter told
the babysitter's mother, and the babysitter's mother called the police. The
police had Mr. Kargar arrested and prosecuted because in Maine, the statutory
definition of "sexual contact" includes "[a]ny act between two persons involv-
ing direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the mouth... of the
6. SEBASTIAN POULTER, ETHNIary, LAW Aim HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ENGIsH ExPERI-
ENCE 322 n.271 (1998).
7. See J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327,
362-53 (1969) ("During Prohibition Congress created an exemption in the Volstead Act for
churches using wine for Communion, though such use was subject to licensing restrictions."
(citing National Prohibition Act, tt. II, § 3, 41 Stat. 308 (1919))).
8. State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996); see also Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine
R. Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense,
47 BuFF. L. REv. 829 (1999) (discussing Kargar and analyzing viability of cultural defenses to
criminal charges).
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other." Now, a number of witnesses, all (like Kargar) recent emigrants from
Afghanistan, testified that kissing an infant son's penis is common in Afghani-
stan, that it is done to show love for the child, that it is acceptable up until at
least the third year of the child's life, and that there are no sexual feelings
involved. (Indeed, if there were sexual feelings, the same culture - Islam as
practiced in Afghanistan - would punish the father's action with death.)9
In the end, the case was disposed of by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine determining that someone - e.g., the court of first instance - ought to
have taken advantage of the state's statutory de minimis provision to dismiss
the prosecution. But one also can see the case as a failure of legislative strat-
egy. Maine uses legislative language that is fanatically rule-like to define the
offense of sexual assault. It uses a rule rather than a standard, which might
require a judgment on the part of judge and prosecutor as to whether this
contact was "indecent." And its rule uses purely descriptive behavioral terms
like "mouth," "genitals," and "physical contact," without any reference to the
point or purpose of the contact (e.g. "for the sake of sexual gratification.")' 0 In
9. Kargar testified that kissing his son's penis shows how much he loves his child
precisely because it is not the holiest or cleanest part of the body. See Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83
n.3.
10. For the distinction between rules and standards, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Sub-
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976).
It is hard to see what the legislators hoped to achieve with such a physically specific
definition of "sexual act." Were they worried about judicial discretion being exercised incompe-
tently or inappropriately in this regard? Cf FREDERICK ScHAUER, PLAYING BY TBE RULEs: A
PHIoSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASF.D DECISION MAKINGIN LAW AND IN LIFE 135-66
(1991) (discussing "the reasons for rules"). Or did it just not occur to them that this legislative
strategy would be beset with problems? In this regard, we must of course take into account that
cases like Kargar's would not have occurred to the legislators of Maine when they defined
"sexual act." As the Court in Kargar observed:
In order to determine whether this defendant's conduct was anticipated by the Legis-
lature when it defined the crime of gross sexual assault it is instructive to review the
not-so-distant history of that crime. [The legislation] makes criminal any sexual act
with a minor (non-spouse) under the age of fourteen. A sexual act is defined as, among
other things, "direct physical contact between the genitals of one and the mouth.. . of
the other." ... Prior to 1985 the definition of this type of sexual act included a sexual
gratification element. The Legislature removed the sexual gratification element because,
"given the physical contacts described, no concern exists for excluding 'innocent'
contacts." . . . The Legislature's inability to comprehend "innocent" genital-mouth
contact is highlighted by reference to another type of "sexual act," namely, "[a]ny act
involving direct physical contact between the genitals... of one and an instrument or
device manipulated by another." The Legislature maintained the requirement that for
this type of act to be criminal it must be done for the purpose of either sexual gratifica-
tion or to cause bodily injury or offensive physical contact. Its stated reason for doing
so was that "a legitimate concern exists for excluding 'innocent' contacts, such as for
proper medical purposes or other valid reasons."
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other words, the Maine provision mentions body parts and specifies contact
between them as the offense, and everyone, no matter what the significance of
contact with those body parts is to them, is held to that norm. Now, is this what
we mean by legal equality, the rule of law, one law for all?
Such an account would be plausible if the best understanding of the law
(and the law's policy in this regard) had to do with body parts and physical
behavior. But in fact the policy behind the statute is in large part itself cul-
tural: it is oriented to the particular meaning - the intense sexual meaning -
of mouth-genital contact in contemporary American culture. Because the law
is oriented toward cultural meaning in that way, it surely should be open to the
possibility that the same behavior (with the same body parts) might have a
quite different cultural meaning to those who only just now are becoming
acquainted with America's sexual obsessions. In this case, an intelligent
application of the rule-of-law ideal seems to militate against the idea of a
single rule applying to everyone; it seems to argue instead for the uniform
application of a standard that condemns the relevant contact on account of its
sexual meaning rather than its purely behavioral characteristics.
II
The Kargar and communion-wine cases provide examples of the need to
think carefilly about the application of this idea of one law for all. But that
paradigm does not work for every case.
For example, it really will not do for the case of the Sikh and his dagger.
Our initial thought in regard to the exception in Section 139(5)(b) of Eng-
land's Criminal Justice Act might be that although the Sikhs (and Druids)
technically are violating the letter of the law by carrying pointed blades in
public, they really are not violating its spirit because their weaponry is purely
ceremonial, unlike (say) the knives carried by soccer hooligans. But there is
something patronizing in the view that the kirpan is carried by the Sikh initiate
purely as a matter of religious observance, as though its ceremonial signifi-
cance had nothing to do with its significance as a weapon. In fact, the Sikh's
religious obligation is an obligation to present himself in public as a combina-
tion of saint and warrior.11 Though it may be a ceremonial obligation, the
Kargar, 679 A.2d at 84-85 (citations omitted). Thus, the legislators' strategy seems to presup-
pose that a rule should be used unless there is a good reason to the contrary. But why should
this be the default position? Because Kargar illustrates the possibility of unpredictably
innocent contacts of this sort, it seems that a more sensitive default would be to use a standard
or at least to include in the rule a reference to the sexual gratification element.
11. See POULTER, supra note 6, at 277-79, 296-97 (noting that English legislators who
defended special exemptions for Sikhs did so in part as tribute to their warrior service in British
army, where they were also exempt from uniform regulations). It is as though a member of the
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (2002)
content of the obligation is in fact at odds with the intent behind the general
prohibition in the statute. The general prohibition aims at a situation in which
people do not present themselves to one another in public as armed, imposing,
martial figures, but the religious obligation of the Sikh initiate is to present
himself in exactly that light.
It is a little bit like the ceremonial use of peyote in the 1989 Supreme
Court case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith. 2 Mr. Smith used peyote in a Native American religious
ceremony, but it was still a violation of narcotics law, and he was fired from
his job as a drug rehabilitation counselor.I3 To avoid stigmatizing Mr. Smith
as a drug addict, we must acknowledge that the use of peyote in his religion
is not a different sort of use from the use which the Oregon law on controlled
substances is supposed to prohibit. There is not a narcotic use on the one
hand and a religious use on the other. The religious use is a narcotic use: it
is the attachment of sacramental meaning to a specific kind of narcosis. (Here
our paradigm of the little sip of communion wine, in relation to legal concerns
about alcohol, is quite misleading.) What happens is that religion adds a layer
of additional significance to the narcotic effect, but that does not detract from
the fact that it is being used as a narcotic.
Moreover, in both cases - the ban on peyote and the ban on carrying
knives in public - the law makers may have intended what is sometimes
referred to as a "zero-tolerance" policy, i.e., a policy set up to be deliberately
impervious to various special motivations that people might have in connection
with the prohibited conduct. As Brian Barry points out, people might be
thought to have a public safety interest in no weapons at all being carried on
the streets, whether the carriers intend them as purely ceremonial objects or
not.' 4 Maybe this public safety interest has to be subordinated to the Sikhs'
religious interest, but there is no denying that it is there."5 Certainly we can
imagine circumstances in which the balance would tilt the other way: should
Sikh convicts be permitted to carry their daggers in prisons if other prisoners
are allowed their rosaries? Similarly, the drug rehabilitation program from
Grenadier guard were given special permission to carry his rifle in public, with fixed bayonet!
Poulter also observes that "[i]niofar... as many Sikhs living in England today attach consider-
able religious and cultural significance to adherence to the 'five k's' [including kirpan], this is
at least partly due to the 'strange syncretism of British military form and Sikh ritual symbolism,'
which developed under the Raj." Id. at 290.
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding that state agency could deny unemployment benefits to Native Americans fired for
testing positive for peyote, even when peyote had been used as part of religious ceremony).
14. BARRY, supra note 5, at 152.
15. Id.
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which Mr. Smith was fired might have an interest in a zero-tolerance policy
concerning the use of narcotics by its staff.' No doubt the zero-tolerance
strategy sometimes can lead to foolishness: newspapers are replete with stories
of children being sent home sobbing, suspended from school, because their
nail-files violated zero-tolerance rules against bringing weapons to school. 7
But if it is going to be used, then the last thing we want is zero-tolerance with
exemptions for favored groups. That seems to be the worst of both worlds.
Thus, even if an exception stated in general terms does not formally
violate the rule of law principle, it still poses a number of difficulties. If we
pass a law prohibiting people from fighting in public, but then make an excep-
tion for the special category of dueling on account of its honorific significance
in the aristocratic culture, I guess we still have a general law (rule plus excep-
tion) that can be consistently administered, but in effect we will have aban-
doned the principle that aristocrats are to be subject to the same restraints as the
rest of us. If we pass a law prohibiting alcohol, but then add an exemption
(again stated in general terms) accommodating cocktail parties held at
government-sponsored gatherings, we still have something that is stateable in
general terms, but no one can deny that it is against the spirit of the rule-of-law
requirement that the law be the same for all.
IV
In the rest of this paper, I want to undertake a more general exploration
of whether we can square the idea of religious and cultural accommodations
with the general principles of the rule of law. I intend the term "religious and
cultural accommodations" to cover a variety of rules and proposals. The
discussion will encompass statutory exceptions like the English example we
have been considering. It also will cover exemptions and privileges suppos-
edly secured by the operation of constitutional principles, such as the princi-
ples of religious freedom in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, at
least under certain interpretations, like the one enacted by Congress in the ill-
fated Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.8 In addition, I want to
16. Or, the drug rehabilitation program that employed Smith might plausibly have a zero-
tolerance approach to narcotics use by its counselors even if the Oregon criminal statute does
not, i.e., even if the statute had an exception for religious use.
17. For example, see Boy Suspended for Pointing Chicken Finger Like a Gun, ATLANTA
CONST., Feb. 5, 2001, at 6D (When an 8-year-old boy pointed a breaded chicken finger at a
teacher and said, 'Pow, pow, pow,' he was suspended from school for three days. It happened
in Jonesboro, Ark., in the same school district where, in 1998, four students and a teacher were
killed and 10 students were injured when they were shot by two students. The school district
has a 'zero tolerance' policy against any sort of weapons.").
18. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-I (1994). The
statute provided:
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discuss the so-called "cultural defenses" put forward and occasionally recog-
nized by the courts in the way of mitigation or excuse of criminal violations.
I mean cases in which there is a suggestion that someone should be excul-
pated - or their culpability diminished - for what would normally count as a
criminal attack on the person or life of another because of the peculiar cultural
significance that they associated with the incident. For example: A woman
attempts to drown herself and her children, and she succeeds in drowning her
children. But, it is said, she was practicing oya-ko-shinju or parent-child
suicide, an ancient Japanese custom, thought not inappropriate in that culture
as a response to one's husband's infidelity. Bearing this in mind, the court
accepts a plea bargain of voluntary manslaughter and sentences her to time
served and five years' probation. 9
As a result, I am cramming together for consideration in this paper
(1) issues about religious and non-religious accommodations, (2) constitutional
and ordinary legislative issues, and (3) criminal law defenses.20 That may give
rise to criticism: even though they all revolve around cultural and religious
issues, an excuse is not the same as an ex ante exemption, and neither of them
is the same as a constitutionally-mandated accommodation. But I think the
problem is worth considering on a general front, partly because I believe I can
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected: (a) In general - Government shall
not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section. (b) Exception - Government may substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Id.
19. See People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1985).
20. Even within the criminal law area, I am throwing together items that a more careful
jurist would distinguish fastidiously. Consider the following: (1) A person is charged with
murder and the charge is "reduced" on account of a "cultural defense." (2a) A charge of murder
is reduced to manslaughter because some essential element of murder is lacking. Or, (2b) a
charge of murder is reduced because of provocation, and a cultural element is invoked in
characterizing the "reasonableness" of the defendant's response to provocation. Or, (2c) the
presence of some other particular element - like "reasonable explanation or excuse" - leads us
to reduce a charge from first- to second-degree. Or, (2d) we accept a complete or partial excuse
of insanity, duress, or diminished responsibility, accepting cultural elements as part of the case
that is made for the existence of the excusing condition. Or, (2e) a cultural factor, or some
heading under which a cultural element might be taken into account, is mentioned in sentencing
guidelines. Or, (2f) if the sentencing guidelines are not rigid, cultural considerations are taken
into account as a mitigating factor by the judge. From a formalist point of view, it matters
enormously into which of these slots - (2a) through (21) - a particular cultural defense fits. But
in the life of the law, what happens is that the courts or the prosecutors are convinced that (1) is
true, and they simply scramble to find something, under (2), to give effect to this opinion. I am
grateful to Kent Greenawalt for discussion of this point.
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throw some light on our reasons for adopting one accommodatory strategy
rather than another - an excuse, say, rather than an exemption, in different
areas of law.2
V
I am conscious that by approaching these matters with the rule of law -
"one law for all" - as my reference point, I already am skewing the discussion
away from some of the most common arguments advanced in the law review
literature in support of cultural accommodations. "The American criminal
justice system is committed to securing justice for the individual defendant,"
said the unnamed student author of one of the earliest and still one of the best
argued pieces on this issue.' "Individualized justice" quickly became a sort
of mantra in the discussion of the cultural defense. Indeed, so dominant is the
rhetoric of individualized justice that many opponents of cultural exemptions
find it necessary to argue within that matrix rather than against it: they
complain that cultural defenses in law pay insufficient attention to the individ-
ualized predicament of the complainant or victim. This is particularly the case
in feminist critiques of the cultural defense.23
In fact, as Alison Dundes Renteln has observed, there is precious little in
the way of genuine individualization in an exemption afforded to someone by
virtue only of his membership in a group.24 Instead, the argument seems to be
21. 1 believe it is also worth having some discussion of cultural accommodations as a
general problem, in a way that is uncontaminated by the U.S. Constitution's particular emphasis
on religious liberty and the arguably artificial distinction that such emphasis requires us to draw
between religious and "merely" cultural practices and beliefs, and uncontaminated too by
debates about judicial review versus legislative solutions to these problems. (In that regard, I
take myself to be following the invitation of Justice Scalia in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), to consider legislative
strategies for promoting religious and cultural liberty, as well as strategies that are mandated by
the Constitution.)
22. Note, The CulturalDefense in the CriminalLaw, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293,1298 (1986).
23. See, e.g., Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the
American Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?, 99 DICK. L.
REV. 141, 163-64 (1994) (arguing that applying cultural defense strips immigrants of individu-
alized justice); Jisheng Li, Comment, The Nature of the Offense: An Ignored Factor in Deter-
mining the Application of the Cultural Defense, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 765,784 (1996) (arguing
that many women would suffer loss of legal protection if abusers could use cultural defenses
to avoid punishment); Sharan K. Suri, Note, A Matter of Principle and Consistency: Under-
standing the Battered Woman and Cultural Defenses, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 107, 135
(2000) (arguing that use of cultural evdience fits within ideal of individualized justice because
it permits punishment only for crimes committed).
24. See Alison Dundes Renteln,A Justification of the CulturalDefense as Partial Excuse,
2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437, 499 (1993) (noting that concerns that focus on cul-
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that by individualizing only to the extent of finding out to which culture
someone belongs, we can use "individualized justice" to leverage our more
important social commitment to cultural diversity. "By judging each person
according to the standards of her native culture, the principle of individualized
justice preserves the values of that culture, and thus maintains a culturally
diverse society."25
However, I doubt whether it is possible to pursue this cultural diversity
line very far in this context with a straight face. The law review authors say
that cultural exemptions promote cultural diversity, which is something we
should treasure. But do we - should we - treasure the fact that in our multi-
cultural society there are many responses to spousal adultery, not just one?
Some people get upset and go to marriage counseling or ask for a divorce.
Others drown their children. Others still set fire to the offending spouse or
bludgeon her to death. Do we really want to say that all of this is part of a rich
mosaic of diversity that we should treasure and that our multi-cultural society
would be the poorer if some of these more diverse responses were eliminated?
This is one of those law review "justifications," the plausibility of which
depends on there being several heavily-footnoted pages of separation between
the statement of the goal - cultural diversity, how nice! - and consideration
of the way it would actually apply - legal exemptions for a diverse array of
murderous responses.
In general, there has been insufficient consideration of what a widespread
application of cultural defenses and cultural exemptions would involve. And
despite the intemperate comments I have just made, I do mean insufficient
thought in both directions: insufficient concern about the rule of law, cer-
tainly, on the part of those who defend cultural exemptions, but perhaps as
well, an all-too-easy panic about the rule of law on the part of those who
oppose them.
It certainly is not difficult to paint a lurid picture of the horrors that
widespread exemptions would involve in relation to our ideals of legality. All
tural group may adversely affect individuals in group); Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Cultural
Defense: Traditional orFonnal?, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 241,255 (1996) ("[A] formal defense
could thwart individualized justice by shifting the focus from individual culpability to cultural
identity."). But Dundes Renteln sees that, in principle, individualized justice ought to be a
factor weighing in favor of cultural defenses. She argues that what looks superficially like the
application of different standards is in fact the sensitive application of a uniform standard - a
standard that aims to treat equals equally, yet encounters cases that are different or unequal in
proportion to either their difference or their inequality along some relevant dimension. See
Dundes Renteln, supra, at 499. She associates this version of individualized justice with the
retributivist principle of proportionality in the law's response to particular situations: we cannot
be sure that we are punishing in proportion to real desert unless we pay attention to the details,
including culturally salient details of motivation and meaning in each particular case. Id. at 500.
25. Note, supra note 22, at 1300.
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we must do is imagine that our society has both a single set of laws and a
complex mosaic of exemptions and defenses, clustered around particular
minority cultures. Then it is easy to see how it might become a hybrid of
affirmative action and benefit of clergy, as each criminal defendant is encour-
aged by his lawyers to scour his past, his ancestry, and his affiliations for
something that can bring him within the benefit of the exemptions recognized
for a newly-favored cultural group. He has bludgeoned his wife to death after
she confessed adultery, and now, his lawyers ask, is there something we can
find in his background that we can cite as the basis of a cultural defense? If
and when we find the appropriate something, can we then coach him in
whatever the courts have established as the local equivalent of the "neck
verse '26 for that culture to establish his credentials as someone governed by
its traditions? How long would it be before defenses of this sort became
established as a way of ensuring that the most powerful and resourceful
defendants - or the children of the most powerful and resourceful citizens -
would have a way of immunizing themselves against the application of laws
that might not in fact have been enacted if it were thought that the powerful
and the resourceful would be subject to them along with everyone else,
"equally with other the meanest men," as John Locke put it?2"
That is the most lurid picture. Certainly it is something of a panic-
stricken hyperbole. Still, if we think this unfair to the case for cultural exemp-
tions, then it is incumbent on us to say something more sensible about what
is undoubtedly a tension between that case and the rule-of-law ideal, which,
as I say, we value so highly.
In Culture and Equality, Brian Barry makes the provocatiVe suggestion
that if there are arguments sufficient to establish the case for a cultural exemp-
26. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Tyburn, Thanatos, and Marxist Historiography: The Case
of the London Hanged, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1158, 1185-86 (1994) (book review):
Benefit of clergy was a legal device that had its origin in the conflicts between
"Church" and "State" of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. As a means of ensuring
the clergy's right to be tried by ecclesiastical courts, English law provided that
anyone capable of reciting the [first verse of the] 51 st Psalm (the "neck verse") could
not be sentenced to death in the royal courts. The presumption was that only
clergymen could read. By the closing years of the seventeenth century, however,
this device had become a well-worn legal fiction. It could be asserted by a defendant
not actually in orders only once; it was available to women, who, theologically,
could not be ordained, and so were unable to join the ranks of the clergy, and finally,
it was unavailable to those convicted of many of the newer statutory offenses.
Id.
27. lI LOCIM, supra note 3, ch. vii, 94.
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tion, they normally would be sufficient to show that the background law is
indefensible on grounds of liberty: "either the case for the law (or some
version of it) is strong enough to rule out exemptions, or the case that can be
made for exemptions is strong enough to suggest that there should be no law
anyway.s28 This is an interesting point because it reminds us that many of the
regulations to which cultural offense is taken are not laws like those prohibit-
ing the killing of an adulterous spouse, but laws governing (supposedly in the
interest of the governed) the detailed way in which ordinary life is led. They
are laws about health, safety, hygiene, diet, and education, or laws promoting
some general goal like the defense of the environment, for which ordinary
citizens have greater or lesser enthusiasm. Many of these laws are paternalis-
tic, and many cultural challenges to them amount in effect to anti-paternalistic
critiques: "Why should the state be entitled to demand that everyone fall into
line in this particular area of life?" If the state can give us a good answer,
strong enough to overcome the objection from individual liberty, then fine;
that is a case for the general law. But then, asks Barry, on what is the case for
the exemption going to be based?
Consider, for instance, the debate about whether Sikhs wearing turbans
should be exempted from the rule that requires motorcyclists to wear crash
helmets. Barry says:
Suppose we accept that it is a valid objective of public policy to reduce the
number of head injuries to motorcyclists, and that this overrides the
counter-argument from libertarian premises. Then it is hard to see how the
objective somehow evaporates in the case of Sikhs and makes room for an
exemption from the law requiring crash helmets.29
The defenders of an exemption may say: "Well, at worst, the Sikhs will only
be harming themselves if they crash, turbaned rather than helmeted, off their
motorcycles." But, as Barry insists, we can't accept this proposition simply
as a point about exemptions:
[Ihfwe are too highly impressed by the point that those who choose to avail
themselves ofthe exemption are not harming others but merely undertaking
a self-imposed risk, we are liable to conclude that the same privilege
should be available to all .... Religion [or culture] appears to play no
essential part in what is in essence a simple argument to the effect that
people should be free to decide for themselves what risks of injury to
accept.... [I]f it is valid, the argument implies that the restrictive law
should be repealed, not that it should be retained and some people allowed
an exemption.
30
28. BARRY, supra note 5, at 39.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 48-49.
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The Hell's Angel wants to feel the wind in his hair (or, these days, in what is
left of his hair) as he rides along, and he too is prepared to bear the cost of
head injury himself (or with health-care resources that in other respects are
rightfully his)." Where is the case for a Sikh exemption that is not also a
Hell's Angel exemption?
Is Brian Barry right about this? Is the demand for a cultural exemption
just a version of the libertarian case against any regulation in the area at all?
One hesitation that I have rests on the thought that there might be something
particularly significant about cultural resistance to a paternalistic or regula-
tory provision, which goes beyond a mere desire for liberty. One of the things
that the cultural objection reminds us of is that law-in-alliance-with-the-state
(what I shall call "state law") is not the only normative order in society, and
not the only agency capable of governing what people wear on their heads or
any of the other myriad areas that we nowadays take for granted as the normal
scope of the state's paternalistic powers. Health, safety, hygiene, and educa-
tion; what people wear on their heads and how they bear themselves; what
they eat, how their meat is slaughtered, what intoxicants they resort to; what
they do with regard to sex, family, child-rearing - these are issues on which
for many people, there is already existing positive regulation (regulation by
their culture or their religion) quite apart from state law.
Thus, the objection to state paternalism is not always a libertarian one.
Many of the objections are based on non-state paternalism, which I guess the
law of the state has an interest in superseding. When we evaluate these
objections, we must not ask, "Why should the state rather than the individual
make the decision about headgear?" or "Why should state law be preferred
to individual liberty?" but rather "Why should state law be preferred to
cultural regulation?" or, more generously, "Why should the state make the
decision about headgear, rather than leaving it to be made by any of the
myriad processes - culture, religion, fashion - that might prevail in the
absence of a state-imposed norm?" Liberty is subordinated or regulated on
both sides of this equation; it is just a question of which regime of regulation
should prevail. This is easiest to see in cases like the regulation of the
slaughter of animals. The groups that seek exemptions from the usual rules
governing the humane slaughter of animals, for halal or kosher slaughter, are
not seeking a regime of cheerful anarchy or individual liberty, with animals
being put to death in any way one pleases. For them, the slaughter of animals
is already intensely regulated by highly specific rules, and their question is
31. The question is not whether he is willing to bear the cost of treating his head injury
out of his own pocket, but whether he is willing to bear the cost of treating his head injury out
of his share of society's resources (including the share of society's health care resources to
which, as a matter ofjustice, he is entitled).
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why these rules should not prevail over the state's rules, at least so far as they
are concerned.
The state, of course, will always try to present the issue as one of regula-
tion versus anarchy. It will say that constraint by a religion that you are free to
leave is not really constraint at all, nor is constraint by a culture whose heritage
you may at any time repudiate. But we should not thoughtlessly accept this
application of the Hobbesian maxim "For he is free, that can be free when he
will."32 We should pay at least some attention to the social reality and the
subjective phenomenology of the alleged "freedom" of the religiously - or
culturally-constrained person.3 For, patently, there is an important sense in
which the existence of multiple regimes of regulation among different commu-
nities of butchers, retailers, and consumers is quite significantly different from
no regulation at all. To use a phrase of Robert Cover's, state law is imperiously
"jurispathic."04 By asserting the importance of law from the center, and dis-
missing anything else as anarchy, the tendency is to stifle and kill law in the
community, or law as held and practiced among communities that have bound-
aries different from those acknowledged by the state. "Confronting the luxuri-
ant growth of a hundred legal traditions," the agents of state law - judges,
especially, on Cover's view - "assert that this one is law and destroy or try to
destroy the rest. 05
32. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 184, ch. 26 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1651).
33. After all, in response to Hobbes's own use of the maxim, to establish that the sov-
ereign is never bound by his own laws, we insist on looking at the actual costs to the sovereign
of changing existing laws to suit himself. The mere fact that, in some sense, he "can" do this
does not settle the issue of whether he is not constrained to some extent.
34. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (suggesting that need for courts stems from need to sup-
press law, rather than to create it).
35. Id. at 53; see also Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns Indian Tribes, States, and
the Federal Courts, 56 U. CII. L. REV. 671,732-33 (1989) (discussing federal court intrusion
into Indian tribal sovereignty). A similar point is developed by my colleague Michael Dorf in
a recent piece on an issue that developed about religious practice in the Yale dormitories.
Michael C. Dorf, God andMan in the Yale Dormitories, 84 VA. L. REV. 843 (1998). Dorf says
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment recognize not only the existence of intense
belief, but the existence of - at least as far as large numbers of people are concerned - the
dominion of another sovereign besides the United States (or the individual states), namely the
sovereign recognized in particular religious traditions. 'This dimension of plural sovereignty
is absent," says Dorf, 'in the case of claims based on an individual's moral or other nonreligious
grounds for objecting to a generally applicable law." Id. at 852. Dorf, too, links the point to
Cover's account of alternative legal communities: "Religious obligations are obligations to
submit to the norms of what Robert Cover called a nomic community - a community that is a
source of norms for its members." Id.
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I do not mean to adopt all elements of Robert Cover's critique along with
his elegant and powerful rhetoric, but I do mean at least to indicate what the
stakes are when paternalistic state law confronts culture in some area ripe for
regulation.36 Understanding that the cultural side presents itself in some sense
as law for those who live by it complicates the rule of law issue I stated above.
For it looks now as though the Diceyan formulation - "every man, whatever
be his rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm"37 - is
already a preference for the rule of one kind of law over another. Among all
the competitors, state law is evidently the only law that has a chance of being
uniform across the whole society (by which I mean the whole society gov-
erned by the state, and everyone in it). None of the others has a prayer of
being uniform to that extent. So the rule-of-law aspiration, "one law for all,"
kicks into the debate perhaps a little too quickly and question-beggingly: it
is the inherent ally of state law, rather than an independent consideration that
helps settle the issue between state law and its cultural competitors.
Perhaps what I stated above goes a little too far in representing the rule
of law as something inherently biased in this debate about cultural exemp-
tions. After all, Dicey's rule of law does sometimes reproach state law. Dicey
himself used it famously to criticize the special status of droit administratif
in the state practice of countries like France.3" Still, a version of the point
survives: to the extent that the Diceyan slogan "one law for all" has a critical
(as opposed to a merely supportive) function in relation to state law, it is to
insist, in the interests of liberty,39 that the state should not enact either laws
riddled with exemptions for the law-makers or their favorites, or special
regimes of law to immunize its officials against the application of the laws
they administer. But then there is something quite sneaky about using that
critical edge to cut away at claims based on the growth of independent social
norms, systems of cultural regulation that are, so to speak, already in place
when the law muscles into an area. When we talk about these cultural exemp-
tions, we are not talking about norms set up to provide special exemptions for
state favorites from the force of state law; we are talking about regimes of
regulation that were already there to some extent, regimes that have some
36. • For a magisterial recent account of the role of such diversity in contributing to the
solution of social problems that traditionally have been addressed by states from the center, ee
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
37. DICEY, supra note 1,at 114.
38. See id. at 213-67 (discussing special legal arrangements for state officials in Continen-
tal legal systems).
39. But remember also the point made earlier to the effect that legally recognized diversity
may be as much a bulwark against despotism as legal uniformity. See supra text accompanying
notes 26-34.
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entitlement, surely, not simply to be crushed or brushed aside at the imperious
whim of the state.
vi.
Let us see if we cannot find a more helpful conception of the underlying
logic of the rule of law difficulty, in regard to cultural exemptions.
We will start with a very simple hypothetical. A problem comes to the
state's attention and the state is determined to do something to address it: the
lawns around public monuments are being destroyed by people walking on the
grass. States being what they are, the natural thing for them to do is pass a
law that says (concerning all public lawns) "No walking on the grass." If
everyone obeys, that will have the desired effect of preserving the beauty of
our public lawns. Time goes by, and someone is arrested for walking on the
lawn. More for fun than in hope, the defendant says to the court that, as far
as he can tell, the survival of the lawns does not depend on literally everyone
keeping off the grass; it will be enough if the overwhelming majority keep off.
One or two stray lawn-walkers actually will do no damage whatsoever.
Because records show that nobody has walked on these lawns for months, the
defendant seeks to have his summons dismissed as a harmless de minimis
offense.
Now the prosecutor may disagree with the defendant about the horticul-
tural facts. The prosecutor may disagree that there is, in regard to the preser-
vation of the lawn, room for the defendant's stated exemption. But even if the
prosecutor accepts that there is room for an exemption, he may insist on
confronting a second issue: why should the defendant, alone among all the
citizens, take it upon himself to award himself the benefit of this exemption?
Isn't that unfair? If there is room for some, but not all, to walk on the grass
without defeating the goal of beautiful lawns, then surely we should take care
that the valuable opportunity is fairly distributed. Fairness is not necessarily
served by dishing it up by way of de minimis exemption to the first resource-
ful person who thought of it. The matter may seem trivial in the lawn case.
But it is not trivial in other cases, such as conscription, when we pay very
careful attention to the way in which exemptions are distributed when military
service is required of some but not all. Fairness requires some procedure -
such as a lottery - or some criterion - such as greater need, for example - to
determine who should get the special privilege of walking on the grass or the
exemption from military service.
This indicates that we now have not one, but two headings of legal
uniformity under whose auspices a claim for exemption may be resisted. If
the grass is so fragile that literally everyone must stay off it, then we resist the
defendant's claim on the ground that nothing less than uniform application
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will do.4" But if there is room for exemption, we still may resist the defen-
dant's opportunistic claim by maintaining that exemptions must be distributed
according to rules that are the same for all.41 Thus, claims for exemption may
be met by rule-of-law based resistance on two fronts: (A) Is there room for
exemption, given the generality of the law's aim? (B) If there is room for
exemption, is it fair to give the benefit of that room to the members of this
cultural or religious group as opposed to other people in society?
This framework is useful in analyzing a number of the cases involving
cultural or religious claims. Consider the issue presented in the 1997 case of
City of Boerne v. Flores.42 The City of Boerne, like many municipalities,
enacted an ordinance to "protect, enhance and perpetuate selected historic
landmarks" and to "safeguard the City's historic and cultural heritage."'43 The
Roman Catholic church of St. Peter was not designated as a landmark, but it
fell partly within the "Historic District" designated by Boerne's Historic
Landmark Commission under the ordinance. When the Archbishop of San
Antonio, for the church, sought a building permit to enlarge St. Peter's, the
application was denied by the Landmark Commission. Consequently, Arch-
40. Of course, people may disagree about whether there is room for exemption. Consider
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), in which the issue was whether a Jewish air force
officer could be exempt from military uniform regulations to the extent of wearing a yannulke.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the traditional out-
fitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of
personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms
encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual
distinctions except for those of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during
peacetime as during war because its personnel must be ready to provide an effective
defense on a moment's notice; the necessary habits of discipline and unity must be
developed in advance of trouble. We have acknowledged that "[t]he inescapable
demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battle-
fields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must
be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection."
Id. (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)). Whether one sees these as general
policies that may be pursued more or less tightly, or as rigid imperatives that must be adminis-
tered with absolute uniformity if they are to work at all, is a matter of dispute.
41. Notice also how this turns the tables on the case that is usually made for cultural and
religious exemptions. That case usually is supported with the rhetoric of fairness: it is unfair
to impose these laws on religious or cultural minorities. But now we are asking not whether
fairness requires an exemption, but whether fairness permits an exemption for the minority
culture. The questions are not incompatible, of course: fairness could permit an exemption and
still it might be an open question whether fairness required it. For a vigorous critique of the
"fairness requires" approach, see BARRY, supra note 5, at 252-91.
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
43. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ordinance
91-05).
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bishop Flores sought the benefit of a religious exemption from the application
of the city's historic district rules, arguing for it as a matter of constitutional
protection of religious freedom (as interpreted by Congress in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).4
Now Boeme is remarkable for many things, not least for its providing a
belated counter-example to Kathleen Sullivan's observation in 1992 "that not
a single religious exemption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from
a mainstream Christian religious practitioner."" But I do not want to focus
on that, nor on the issue of judicial supremacy posed in the Court's attitude
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Let us approach it from a purely
legislative or administrative point of view. We are the City Council enacting
the ordinance, and we are considering inserting an ex ante religious or cultural
exemption; or we are the Historic Landmark Commission and we are consid-
ering an ex post exemption for this particular case. Is there any reason of
principle not to grant an exemption? Well, we apply our two-pronged test:
(A) is there room for an exemption? and (B) if there is, is it fair to assign the
benefit of that room to this religious group?
On (A), the answer seems to be "yes." The protection of the City's
historical and cultural heritage surely is not an all-or-nothing matter. Like
most legislative goals, it is a matter of degree, and it is the sort of thing that
normally is pursued with a great many compromises. Moreover, every indica-
tion is that St. Peter's church is not crucial to the preservationist scheme: It
is not itself a designated landmark, and it was arguable even whether the
whole structure fell within the "Historic District." At worst, if the church had
had the benefit of an exemption, the result would be that the historic character
of downtown Boerne would have been slightly or somewhat compromised. 46
44. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997) (noting arguments of Arch-
bishop Flores).
45. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 216
(1992).
46. If time permitted, I would like to discuss the dangers in any simple view that the city's
historic preservation law is not a regulation about religion. Suppose, to vary the case in City
of Boerne slightly, Archbishop Flores and his flock had become convinced that baroque decora-
tion was an offense to God and proposed to convert the ornate exterior of their church into
something as plain as a Quaker meeting-house. Meanwhile, the city has enacted historic pres-
ervation ordinances, the terms and application of which reflect the secular aesthetic preferences
of the leading citizens. Are we happy - in this hypothetical - with the city simply prohibiting
the church's iconoclasm? I think we should not be.
A better way to look at the issue is that the decoration of churches, like the organization
of ceremonies and the use of song, is a religious matter, it is part of what a religion involves -
the use of earthly beauty to the glorification of God - and as various iconoclastic movements
have shown, historically the theological stakes in this regard can be very high indeed. As a
secular matter, the city's preference for beautiful churches is utterly parasitic on this: it is like
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On (B), the issue is interesting. In his concurrence in the Supreme Court
decision in the case, Justice Stevens observed that "[i]f the historic landmark
happened to be a museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not
be eligible for an exemption from the city ordinances that forbid an enlarge-
ment of the structure."47 There was something unfair, he implied, about the
church claiming the benefit of an exemption simply because it was a religious
group; this, to his mind, smacked of religious preference, indeed of something
approaching establishment.4 He raised an interesting point. It is a version of
Brian Barry's point, adapted mutatis mutandis from the crash helmet case.
Assuming, in the crash helmet case, that the state has an interest in reducing
the number of head injuries from motorcycle accidents, 4 9 it is plain that
reducing the number is a matter of degree, so there is certainly room for
exemptions.c The question is: Given the existing room for exemption, why
should the benefit of that room go to Sikhs and not to Hell's Angels, given
that members of both groups have a strong desire for non-canonical head-
gear? Similarly, why should the Catholics rather than the secular art gallery
get the benefit of the room for exemption that there undoubtedly is in the City
of Boerne's historic preservation scheme? Why is it fair to give the benefit
of the exemption to the group claiming it on cultural or religious grounds?
5'
an English atheist's affection for the Book of Common Prayer. The idea that the city ought to
be able to enforce these preferences, as soon as its legislators are capable of blinding themselves
to the religious values on which their preferences are parasitic, is something I find profoundly
offensive. Now City of Boenee is not exacty the hypothetical case I have just outlined. But it
is not so far from it as to justify the quite careless way in which the Supreme Court majority
categorized the aesthetic regulations in question as neutral, secular, and having nothing to do
with any matter of religion.
47. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. Id. "Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA
[the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] gives its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an
exemption from a generally applicable, neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually
prevail under the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that
no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to
irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment." Id.
49. BARRY, supra note 5, at 48.
50. I mean the reduction can be more or less, depending, among other things, on how
many motorcyclists wear crash helmets. Suppose all do, then we reduce head injuries from a
large number, x, to perhaps a smaller number, m. Suppose all but a few do, then we stil get a
reduction, only now not quite so much: to n rather than m. It is hard to imagine why the state
should be so compulsive about reducing the level to the mth, rather than to the nth degree. So
we could afford to have rule plus exemption and still pursue our policy to some extent.
51. Notice that this fairness point is not the same as a "floodgates" or "parade of hor-
ribles" argument - the sort of argument used in Smith, and much earlier in Reynolds v. United
States, to the effect that if a religious exemption were allowed in the instant case, the floodgates
would open and everyone, citing a spurious religious grounds, would "become a law unto
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VIII.
I am not sure that there ever has been a satisfactory answer to this ques-
tion. Archbishop Flores and the enactors of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act presumably seek refuge in the religion clauses of the Constitution at
this point, claiming as a matter of positive constitutional law that we have no
choice but to give religious liberty special preference over liberty generally.
But that is not a satisfying answer; it merely accepts the Framers' stipulation.
Thus, let me try something else.
I should warn you that the remarks that follow in the rest of this Part are
quite tentative and sketchy. They certainly do not correspond - nor are they
intended to correspond - to established constitutional doctrine. Since Smith
and Boerne, the Court has been emphatic that there is no constitutional
requirement of exemption for religious groups under generally applicable laws
not aimed specifically at a religion or at religious practices.5 2 As I said before,
what I am musing about here (in response to Justice Scalia's invitation to
consider legislative rather than constitutional strategy) is what would be a fair
and tolerant approach for law-makers to adopt with regard to exemptions.
himself" Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990)
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). The floodgates argument posits
that were there room for exemption, we would be unable to control the number of exemptions
and that they would quickly overflow from the room available for them. This is different from
the fairness point.
52. Nor is there a constitutional requirement of strict scrutiny for these laws in their ap-
plication to religion. As Justice Scalia explained in Smith:
The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it is
familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before the
government may accord different treatment on the basis of race,.. . or before the
government may regulate the content of speech, ... is not remotely comparable to
using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other fields -
equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech - are constitu-
tional norms; what it would produce here - a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws - is a constitutional anomaly.... If the "compelling interest" test
is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions
thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if "compelling interest" really
means what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other
fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting
such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct pro-
portion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce
or suppress none of them. Precisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made
up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference, . . . and precisely
because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury
of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regu-
lation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-88 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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So, why is it not unfair to other citizens to give members of minority
cultures or religions special accommodations with regard to otherwise gener-
ally applicable laws? One sort of answer attends to the special intensity of
commitment and devotion that people associate with their religious obliga-
tions. But that will hardly do as a direct response to the fairness complaint,
particularly if the complaint comes from those passionately opposed the law
in question, but on non-religious grounds. They feel strongly - the religious
people feel strongly; where is the relevant difference? I have argued else-
where that it is normal for the law to have to stake its claim to our compliance
and support in a context of serious moral and political disagreement as to what
the content of the law's demands ought to be.53 If a given provision is op-
posed by 30% of those to whom it applies, there is surely something invidious
about granting the benefit of the space for, say, a 5% exemption-rate to those
whose opposition happens to be religious, while dismissing the claims of other
members of the 30% who might have felt equally strongly. Maybe as a matter
of prudence the state should be reluctant to pitch its puny enforcement re-
sources against someone who is convinced that he will suffer eternal punish-
ment if he does what the state demands. But the threat of eternal damnation
is hardly characteristic of all religions, nor even of all religious obligations for
those religions that do in principle acknowledge the possibility of hellfire.
And of course this line of argument provides little explanation for the toler-
ance that we have for non-religious cultural exemptions, which may not be
associated with anything of the kind at all.
A moment ago, I asked: what is there to distinguish religious and cul-
tural opposition to a given law, on the one hand, from other sorts of opposi-
tion which might be felt equally strongly? But maybe this is the wrong
question to ask. The Sikh who feels strongly about carrying his kirpan may
or may not be opposed to the provision of the Criminal Justice Act that
outlaws weapons in public. Maybe he agrees that public weapon-carrying in
general is a good idea, but I do not think his Sikh faith or culture commits
him to this. (On the contrary, initiates of his brotherhood are supposed to
practice "the five k's," precisely to distinguish themselves from others around
them.) In this case, then, it would be a mistake to focus on any comparison
in intensity between his desire to carry the kirpan and someone else's (say,
Bernard Goetz's) opposition to the law. On the other side, someone may
oppose a particular law without any thought that if his opposition is defeated
it would be appropriate to seek an exemption for himself. I may oppose
strongly the prohibition of alcohol without thinking that I have a case (strong
in proportion to my opposition) for an exemption for my personal use. Even
53. See JEREMYWALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 7 (1999) (arguing that purpose of
law is to enable people to act together or within a single framework despite disagreement).
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if one's opposition is based on cultural or religious values, it may not be
appropriate to seek an exemption.
This indicates that the case for exemption should not be regarded as
though it were in any sense proportionate to the extent or intensity of one's
opposition to the law. I think the claim for exemption is characteristically
based on a different sort of factor. It is based on the belief that the state law
provision will have a special kind of impact on one's life, which it will not
necessarily have on the lives of others. Here I want to refer again to my
earlier point about the positive existence of some alternative scheme of
regulation sustained by a religion or a minority culture. 4 A requirement of
state law may be irksome and burdensome to many, but it has a particular sort
of impact on somebody whose life in the area to which the law applies has
been organized on the basis of a quite different scheme of regulation. Such
a person may well feel torn if the state law is applied to him - torn between
a requirement imposed by the state and another imposed by his church or
community. But it is not just a matter of how strongly he feels; nor is it a
matter of his own strong or conscientious belief that he - or we all - ought to
be under a different obligation. 5 His being pulled in the direction of the
cultural or religious practice (contrary to the state law) has social reality; it is
not just a matter of subjective conviction. Because of the positive existence
of a scheme of regulation rivaling the state law, the person we are considering
is already under a socially-enforced burden, established as part of an actual
way of life, a burden grounded in the actually-existing and well-established
regulation and coordination of social affairs afforded by a religious or a
cultural tradition. Others claiming an exemption simply as a matter of liberty
or personal conscience might not be under any burden comparable to that.
(To repeat Michael Dorf's formulation: "Religious obligations are obligations
to submit to the norms of what Robert Cover called a nomic community - a
community that is a source of norms for its members. This dimension... is
absent in the case of claims based on an individual's moral or other nonreli-
gious grounds for objecting to a generally applicable law.") 6
Being torn in this way is just one aspect of the phenomenon I want to
capture. Others include the basis of a person's acquaintance with the scheme
of regulation. Cases involving cultural exemptions sometimes involve people
who profess ignorance of the laws that the state has applied to them in defi-
54. See Part VI and accompanying text (discussing Robert Cover and charge that imposi-
tion of state law wasjurispathic).
55. But see also Jeremy Waldron, Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility, in CrriZEN-
SHIP IN DIVERsE SoCIETs 155 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 2000) (discussing
relation between claims based on cultural identity and claims based on culturally-grounded
opinions).
56. Dorf, supra note 35, at 852.
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ance of their culturally-based expectations." Kargar - the case of the man
arrested for kissing his eighteen-month-old son's penis - was certainly a case
of this kind.5" Now the usual response to such professions is to fall back on
the old Blackstone maxim that mistake or ignorance of the law is no excuse:5 9
For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion not only
may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of
defense. Ignorantiajuris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat,
is as well the maxim of our own law, as it was of the Roman.6'
But the appeal to Blackstone is inconclusive in the present context for a
number of reasons. First, the maxim is not in fact taken seriously as a general
principle by very many modem authorities."' Second, as Dan Kahan points
57. Of course not all people do. As Anh T. Lam explains in Culture as a Defense:
Preventing Judicial Bias Against Asians and Pacific Islanders, I ASIAN AM. PACIFIC ISLANDS
L.J. 49, 58 (1993), "cultural minority defendants usually know that it is illegal, for example,
to kill one's wife or one's children." Id.
58. See generally State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996).
59. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHUHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 288-89 (5th ed. 1989) (stating that defendants must comply
with American law regardless of cultural background). But see Deirdre Evans-Pritchard &
Alison Dundes-Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of Culture: A Hmong 'Marriage by
Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 22 (1995) (criticizing maxim
and suggesting that cultural backgrounds of Hmong provide for mistake of fact defense to rape
because defendant had different understanding of event, not law).
60. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 27. Apparently Black-
stone restated Sir Matthew Hale's position, see MATrJHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROwN 42 ("[Ignorance of the law cannot relieve criminal liability 'because every person is
bound to know the law, and presumed to do so.'"), who in turn had relied on the 1568 civil case
of Brett v. Rigden, I Plow 340, 342, 75 Eng. Rep. 516, 520 (1568), but Blackstone adds the
curious remark that the ignorantia maxim "is as well the maxim of our own law, as it was of the
Roman," referring to DIG. 22.6.9 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18). In fact, the similar Roman maxim
errorjuris noce4 errorfacti non nocet ("error of law injures, error of fact does not") never was
applied by the Romans to the field of criminal law. See David De Gregorio, Comment, People
v. Marrero andMistake of Law, 54 BRoOK. L. REV. 229,248 n.90 (1988). Its exclusive applica-
tion to civil law was constricted and limited to certain specific situations, all involving private
rights. Id.
61. See Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. ClM. L. &
CRIDIINoLoGY 507, 518 n.77 (1986) for several critiques of Blackstone's maxim:
Glanville Williams [who called Blackstone's maxim "ludicrous"] summarizes some
of the more telling rejections of Blackstone: Lord Mansfield drily remarked that
"it would be very hard upon the profession, if the law was so certain, that every-
body knew it" and Maule J. is credited with the observation that "everybody is
presumed to know the law except His Majesty's judges, who have a Court of
Appeals set over them to put them right."
Id. (quoting GLANvILLE WhIAMS, CRIMUNAL LAW: TIM GENERAL PART 290 (2d ed. 1961)).
As to the status of Blackstone's maxim in modem American law, see Justice Brennan's state-
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out, although our doctrine today is not entirely consistent, the courts are most
likely to recognize ignorance of the law as a defense in relation to an offense
that is malum prohibitum rather than in relation to one that is malum in se; in
other words, "courts have recognized mistake of law as a defense because the
underlying conduct violates no moral norms independent of the law that
prohibits it."'62 But we can hardly pretend that the distinction between mala
in se and mala prohibita is culturally neutral, or that acquaintance with its
application fairly can be required of everyone, irrespective of his background.
Indeed, precisely the problem we are dealing with is that the congruence
between moral norms and legal norms differs as between defendants from
different cultural backgrounds. To put it another way, being acquainted with
(or immersed in) the moral practices that make sense of the state law notion
of mala in se is part of the cultural equipment for dealing with the law that
some people may have and that others lack in a multi-cultural society.63 As
for mala prohibita, surely the issue is that members of a minority culture may
very well find it surprising or mysterious that some action is prohibited,
whereas members of the mainstream culture may be quite inured to this. This
element of being taken by surprise may not correlate with intensity of opposi-
tion to the law in question, but it may well correlate with the cultural or
religious factor, inasmuch as there is no basis - except specific legal knowl-
edge - for a person not acquainted with debates in our culture on some
issue to become aware of legal prohibitions. In the mainstream culture, both
defenders and opponents of a given law will be roughly aware of its provisions
as a matter of cultural know-how. The issue will be in the culture, even if there
is no particular consensus on it. People in a particular culture who are alert to
public debate on a given issue know that they should anticipate the possibility
of regulation. In other words, knowledge of the law is in large part a matter of
being on alert in various areas in which there are likely to be regulatory issues
and knowing to which areas to be alert. (It follows, I think, that those responsi-
ble for enforcing the law should try to figure out as far as they can in advance
ment in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring): "If the
ancient maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' has any residual validity, it indicates that
the ordinary intent requirement - mens rea - of the criminal law does not require knowledge
that an act is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy." Id. This is not at all the same as saying ignor-
ance of law is never an excuse.
62. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse- But Only for the Virtuous, 96 McH.
L. REV. 127, 149 n.89 (1997) (collecting cases).
63. For the notion of "cultural equipment" in this context, I am grateful to Jessica Alm-
qvist, The Relevance of Cultural Difference for Social Justice: The Case of Cultural Equipment
(unpublished draft), drawing on Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51
AM. Soc. REv. 273,286 (1986) (discussing how culture influences action by shaping a tool kit
of cultural equipment from which people construct strategies of action).
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what areas of life and action in which people from, say, immigrant communi-
ties are likely to be surprised to find that the state has an interest; and they
should try to do something, in the way of outreach and publication education,
about this gap in their knowledge and expectations.)
This brings me to a third point. Because our topic is the rule of law, we
should remember that afficionados of that ideal always have been particularly
interested in legal publicity and promulgation and in the basis on which
people become familiar with legal regulations.' This is not supposed to be
just a fake or formalist interest. Rule-of-law theory is interested in the impor-
tance of actual promulgation, and the rule-of-law ideal is supposed to hold
actual legal systems to quite high standards in this regard.6' Thus, when we
confront the question of cultural accommodations within a rule of law frame-
work, it ill behooves us to rest anything on a presumption that everyone is
already familiar with the law's requirements. On the contrary, not just our
multi-cultural sensitivity but also our rule-of-law ideals direct us to look very
carefully at the cultural equipment that knowledge of the law presupposes,
and at the way in which this equipment - access to the basis on which laws
can be known and legal regulation anticipated - is distributed in society.
Under this heading of cultural equipment, I have in mind everything from
language skills to a person's having a background in a culture that has grown
up side-by-side with state law in a way that makes its members familiar with
the main contours and tendency of welfare-state regulation and that has been
able to set or adjust its cultural sights accordingly.
L/.
My suggestion has been that the fairness objection sometimes can be
answered by noticing the special situation of someone who feels bound by
authoritative and compelling norms that are at variance with those promul-
gated by the state, norms that may loom larger on that person's horizons than
the arcane and perhaps (to them) quite unfamiliar provisions of state-law
regulations. It is a sketchy suggestion, and it needs much more work, but I do
think it is important. At the same time, I am aware that my suggestion will not
work in all cases.
Sometimes it is the purpose of the law to change or to have an improving
impact upon existing cultural practices. State law may aim to reform some
64. See, e.g., LON FuLLE, THE MORArTY OF LAW 43-44, 49-51 (1964) (discussing
publication and promulgation of laws and duties, and benefits and problems therof).
65. There are also rle-of-law issues connecting constancy of the laws (opposing frequent
change) with promulgation. See id. at 79-81 (arguing that "legislative inconstancy" is principle
forming internal morality of law that seems least suited to formalization in a constitutional
restriction).
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aspect of mainstream culture. It may aim to stigmatize domestic violence, for
example, or to outlaw vendettas, or to stop people from beating their children,
or to change the culture of masculine honor that leads some men to respond
murderously to their spouse's infidelity. Consider the last of these examples.
We say to hot-blooded young men in mainstream culture: "Look, we know
this is difficult for you, but you have to curb your rage, even when your
partner has been unfaithfid, because this sort of response is no longer going
to be regarded as reasonable or even excusable behavior." Now that imposes
a certain cost on the mainstream culture - a cost we think is well worth
imposing - but that nevertheless must be borne by people brought up to
behave in a particular way. There will be a certain amount of discomfort and
disorientation for a generation or two as they struggle with unfamiliar and -
to them initially - inappropriate modes of self-control.
Then suppose we have a case in which a member of a minority immigrant
community responds murderously to his wife's adultery and subsequently
invokes a cultural defense. An expert anthropologist testifies that in the man's
native culture, a wife's adultery is considered an enormous and appalling stain
on his family, reflecting on the man's ancestors and descendants, and that an
out-of-control murderous reaction would not be unusual or abnormal for a
member of this particular culture in this sort of situation. One example is the
case of People v. Dong Lu Chen,' a notorious case in which a Chinese
immigrant bludgeoned his wife to death with a claw-hammer after she con-
fessed that she had been unfaithful to him. 7 Leaving aside for a moment the
66. No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1998).
67. People v. Dong Lu Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1998). There are
numerous articles discussing this case, beginning with Melissa Spatz, A "Lesser" Crime: A
Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their Wives, 24 CoLtM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 597 (1991), whose description is as good as any:
In the recent New York case of People v. Chen, the court used the cultural defense
to reduce the sentence for a Chinese immigrant who murdered his wife. Dong Lu
Chen - a man who had immigrated from China one year earlier - decided to talk
to his wife, Gian Wan Chen, about their sexual relationship. When she admitted
to having an affair, he left the room, returned with a hammer, knocked her onto a
bed and hit her on the head eight times, killing her.
Chen confessed to killing his wife. His defense attorney argued that cultural
pressures had resulted in Chen's "diminished capacity," rendering him unable to
form the necessary intent for a charge of premeditated murder. Burton Pasternak,
a professor of anthropology at Hunter College in New York City, testified on
Chen's behalf. He explained that in traditional Chinese culture, a wife's adultery
is taken as proof that her husband has a weak character, divorce is considered
shameful. A husband often becomes enraged upon hearing of his wife's infidelities
and threatens to kill her. However, someone in the community generally stops him
before he actually harms her. Since nobody could stop Dong Lu Chen, the defense
argued, his wife died.
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question of exactly what form the defense took in Chen's case, it is pretty
clear that members of the mainstream culture would have a legitimate com-
plaint of unfairness if anything like this cultural defense were to succeed in
the case of the immigrant. They would say, "Look, everyone must modify
their culture in this regard. Everyone is having to develop new forms of self-
control, which are at odds with the way they have been socialized. Why
should society give the members of this culture a special exemption from a
painful process that every culture in this society is having to undergo?"
X
That would be the fairness response for cases of this kind. But in cases
of this kind, there is also a response to the argument for a cultural defense that
requires us to ask whether there is even room for exemption.
A particular law or legal doctrine may be evaluated in various ways in the
context of whether room for exemption exists, given the generality of the
law's aim. Compare - forgive the flippancy - a ban on homicide with a ban
on hunting wild animals out of season. The ban on hunting might be moti-
vated by a desire to preserve some species of animal, giving it a chance to
breed or to ensure perhaps a fair supply of deer for hunters in season. Such
a law naturally admits of room for exemption because the preservation of the
species is a matter of degree and probably one deer more or less does not
matter. Our aim is to reduce the killing of deer during the off season - prefer-
ably to reduce it to zero, but if not to zero then as near to zero as we may
reasonably come. So there is space there that might be made available, say,
to Native Americans who have a cultural or religious imperative of sacrificing
a deer on mid-winter's day. (Of course, there would still be the problem of
fairness.)
With a general prohibition on murder, the case is quite different. It is
true that the law's policy is to reduce the number of homicides, preferably to
zero or as close to zero as possible, and some aspects of the law's operation,
such as punishment of homicide for the sake of general deterrence, are con-
nected to this aim. But the law also has a more immediately focused relation
In this case, the cultural defense was successful. Judge Edward K. Pincus
found that Chen "was driven to violence by traditional Chinese values about
adultery and loss of manhood." According to Judge Pincus, Chen's Chinese
heritage created pressures that led him to kill his wife, it made him more "suscepti-
ble to cracking under the lesser crime of circumstances," resulting in his diminished
capacity. The court found Chen guilty of... second degree manslaughter and
sentenced him to five years probation - the lightest possible sentence for the
charge.
Id. at 621-22.
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to any particular homicide or potential homicide: it is a matter of the utmost
urgency that each one be prevented. So, for example, if I am about to kill
Brian Barry, the law's attitude toward me is much more focused than its atti-
tude toward my hunting out of season. The ban on murder gives law enforce-
ment officials an immediate and powerful reason to stop me from killing
Brian, and if need be, they will devote enormous resources to this end. This
is quite apart from any question of punishment. As far as the specific-preven-
tion aim of the law is concerned, there is no room for any exemption: Brian
is not to be killed. But then suppose nevertheless the law fails and I do kill
him. Then the law must punish me. Now part of the point of this punishment
is general deterrence. Insofar as that policy is concerned, there might be room
for exemption. The policy of generally deterring homicide will go forward
only marginally less effectively if I am let off from punishment for killing
Brian. However, punishing me also would have a more focused aim - doing
justice to Brian posthumously, or maybe to his loved ones. There, once again,
there may be much less room for compromise.
Another way of putting this is to say that some of the most important
aspects of the law's ban on homicide are "right-based": they are oriented to
the interests of individuals (their interest in not being killed) one-by-one,
rather than en masse in the spirit of minimizing killing." As far as the possi-
ble killing of Brian Barry is concerned, the duties that the law imposes exist
for the sake of preventing or, if it cannot be prevented, for the sake of punish-
ing, that killing. In this regard, it is quite unlike the ban on hunting, which -
to say the least - is never focused on the lives of particular deer (Bambi
excluded) in quite the same sort of way.
This helps us understand certain things about proposals for a cultural
defense. In areas like homicide, no one ever proposes the cultural defense as
anything other than an excuse or an ingredient in an excuse.69 No one who
believes in the cultural defense would oppose a police officer intervening to
prevent Mr. Chen from killing his wife. Similarly, no one, whatever their
cultural sensitivity, would suggest that our respect for diversity and individu-
alized justice requires us to stand back and let Mrs. Kimura drown her chil-
68. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974) (outlining use of
moral restraints and goals as related to individual rights); Joseph Raz, On dhe Nature of Rights,
93 MIND 194, 195 (1984) (defining relation between rights and interests); see also Jeremy
Waldron, Introduction, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 13 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) ("A prohibition
on torture is right-based only if the implications of torture for a single individual are taken to
be sufficient to generate the requirement; but if it is argued that no single interest can generate
a requirement until the impact of the action in question on other interests has been considered,
then we are dealing with a utilitarian goal-based approach.").
69. I guess the closest we ever come to justification is the possibility of a peculiar cultural
apprehension informing the application of principles of self-defense.
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dren. There is no room for that sort of exemption. The only room for exemp-
tion, leaving quite aside the issue of fairness that I raised a moment ago
(fairness vis-A-vis the duty of self-control borne by members of the main-
stream culture), is at the level of punishment, when combinations of plea-bar-
gaining, excuse, and mitigation kick in. (So Mr. Chen and Mrs. Kimura both
find that murder charges are reduced to charges of second degree manslaugh-
ter, and they do not face incarceration.)7 0 And even then, as feminist critics
of the decision have emphasized, there is injustice to the rights of the victim;
full vindication of the victims' rights would leave no room for exemption at
all, not even at the level of punishment.
By contrast, in some of the other cases we have been considering, there
would be no point in having cultural accommodations ifthey operated only like
excuses. Dr. Goldman does not just want his guilt mitigated and his punish-
ment reduced for wearing non-uniform headgear in the Air force; he wants not
to be prevented from wearing it.72 The statutory defense that exculpates the
Sikh with his kirpan in England means not only that he does not pay a fine or
go to jail for carrying a weapon in public; he should not even be stopped or
arrested. This also holds true for the legislative exemptions envisaged for
70. For a discussion of Kimura, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. In Dong Lu
Chen, the resolution was as follows: The New York Superior Court judge, heavily swayed by
the expert's testimony about the cultural roots of Dong Lu Chen's actions, acquitted Dong Lu
of second-degree murder and found him guilty of second-degree manslaughter. The judge
opined:
Were this crime... committed by the defendant as someone born and raised in
America, or born elsewhere but primarily raised in America, even in the Chinese
American community, the Court would have been constrained to find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter in the first-degree.... [B]ut based on the cultural aspects,
the effect of the wife's behavior on someone who is essentially born in China,
raised in China, and took all his Chinese culture with him except the community
which would moderate his behavior, [1] . . . find[ ] the defendant guilty of man-
slaughter in the second degree.
Dong Lu Chen was freed on his own recognizance until sentencing. On March 30, 1989, the
judge sentenced Dong Lu to five years probation and no jail time. See Cathy C. Cardillo, Note,
Violence Against Chinese Women: Defining the Cultural Role, 19 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 85,
93 (1997) (footnotes omitted) (describing Dong Lu Chen).
71. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multicultural-
ism: The Liberals'Dilemma, 96 COLUA. L. REv. 1093, 1097 (1996) (suggesting that balancing
must occur between defendant's interest in using cultural defense while victim's interest in
obtaining full protection of laws); Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence andMale Violence: Are
Feminist andMuliculturalistReformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 36, 36 (1995) (arguing that criminal justice system must accommodate diverging goals
of feminists and multiculturalists); Li, supra note 23, at 782 (arguing that victim's rights militate
against allowing cultural defense in context of violent crimes).
72. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504-07 (1986) (noting Goldman's argu-
ment that regulation in question infringed on First Amendment freedom of religious exercise).
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Native American church members and their peyote and for Catholics and their
communion wine during prohibition.
So whether there is room for exemption, and how much room for what
sort of exemption, will depend first, on what legal policy the law is seeking
to promote; second, on what strategy is being used to pursue that policy; and
third, on how the policy and the strategy play out with regard to different
aspects of the law's application.
XI.
I will now summarize the role that cultural understandings may play in
debates about the regulation of various forms of behavior. Suppose that there
is support in a society like ours for the imposition of a scheme of regulation
or restriction in some area of life - motorcycle safety, historic preservation,
toilet-training, narcotics use, whatever. The claim that regulation is necessary
will no doubt strike some people as wrong, and among these, some will regard
it as culturally biased. Nevertheless, the proposal has been made - it is out
there on the table - and the question is now whether we as a society should
proceed with it. At this stage, the members of society must talk to one an-
other and evaluate the proposal, trying as hard as they can to communicate
and understand what may seem (initially at least) like incommensurable as
well as incompatible points of view.
I do not believe this process can be trumped or short-circuited on the
basis of any claim about the natural or neutral necessity for the scheme of
regulation. (Although it often it is, in a sort of casually majoritarian way: we
just assume that our welfarist projects are legitimate, and we attribute our
deafness to any contrary view to cultural relativism on side of the dissenter.)"
73. In Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 305, 312-13 (1999), I argued that this is something that human rights proponents are often
particularly guilty of. For example,
we are not entitled to sanitize the Muslim response to our toleration of pornography
as nothing but relativist resistance to the universalization of our standards. It is much
more important than that. Precisely because relativism is for the most part silly and
misconceived as a philosophical position, any resistance to our universalization of
human rights doctrine should be read charitably as a direct challenge to the sub-
stance of the doctrine.... [I]t should not be taken as a resistance to universalization
as such.... If we are going to strut around the world announcing, and where
possible enforcing, universal human rights claims, the only thing that can possibly
entitle us to do that is that we have carefully considered everything that might be
relevant to the moral and political assessment of such claims. It is not enough that
we have considered what Kant said to Fichte, or what Bruce Ackerman said to John
Rawls. The price of legitimizing our universalist moral posturing is that we make a
good faith attempt to address whatever reservations, doubts, and objections there are
about our positions out there, in the world, no matter what society or culture or
religious tradition they come from. Apart from that discipline and that responsibility,
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On the other hand, I do not think that debate on such issues between members
of different cultural and religious communities is necessarily a dialogue of the
deaf. Humans are enormously curious about each other's ideas and reasons
and are enormously resourceful in listening to and learning from one another
across what appear to be barriers of cultural comprehensibility, often far
beyond what philosophers and theorists of culture predict is possible. Perhaps
over-influenced by the Wittgensteinian idea that effective communication
presupposes some sort of agreement in judgments,74 we theorists tend to think
that deliberation requires a framework of common concepts and understand-
ings; and we are less embarrassed than we ought to be when, time and again,
various seafarers and traders and migrants prove us wrong. At any rate, I
think it is a serious mistake to approach the problem of inter-cultural delibira-
tion with the a priori conviction that a stalemate of mutual incomprehensibil-
ity is bound to result. This approach tends to tilt all too quickly into an
untested and quite malignant assumption to the effect that "there is no talking
to these people."
In this debate about the regulation-proposal, the existence of a particular
cultural practice may figure in two ways. It may figure, first, as the experien-
tial basis of a view about the desirability of regulation. For example, Native
American users of peyote may oppose a blanket ban on the use of this halluci-
nogen, arguing on the basis of their experience with it that the substance has
valuable psychological and spiritual properties when used moderately in a
properly supervised environment. Second, the existence of a particular cultural
practice may serve as the basis of a proposal for a specific exemption from any
general ban on the use of peyote, if such a ban is implemented despite the
Native American users' first intervention. This proposal will have to show that
there is room for exemption and that it may be allocated fairly to the members
of this group. Thus it is at this second stage that we ask the two questions -
(A) concerning the room for exemption and (B) the fairness of applying any
exemption to one group over another - that I have identified. At this point, if
I am right in what I said in earlier Parts, the argument will be about special
hardship and people being torn two ways by existing state law and existing
cultural laws.
we have no more right to be confident in the universal validity of our intuitions than
our opponents in another culture have to be confident in theirs. And that is a difficult
assignment, because such doubts and reservations and objections will often chal-
lenge not just the content of our conclusions, but our whole way of thinking about
the issues that we address in our human rights concerns.
Id.
74. See LUDwiG WrrrGENS iN, PHiLOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 88, 1 242 (O.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1973) (stating that "[i]f language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but also... in judgments").
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Now here is my point: I do not think we gain anything by conflating these
two types ofintervention. Returning to Brian Barry's book, Culture andEqual-
ity, I think part of the problem with Barry's analysis is that he conflates the two
kinds of intervention. Uncharitably, Barry thinks that the second intervention
is just the rear-guard strategy of a sore loser who has lost out in the first battle.
In his account, the Native American we are imagining simply opposes laws that
restrict his use of peyote. He first tries to oppose them as a general matter of
principle, based on his cultural experience. Then when he fails at that, he tries
to modify them by securing for himself an exemption. That really does make
the exemption strategy look disreputable as an approach to legality. It really
does look like something incompatible with the rule of law. But if we adopt the
more careful analysis that I have suggested, we can see that each of the two
interventions that I am imagining is much more respectful of legality. We also
can see that there is nothing automatic in the progression from the first inter-
vention to the second. Everything depends on what sort of argument prevailed
at the first stage, for any argument about the room for exemptions and their
proper distribution is going to have to be relative to that; and it depends too on
the particular case that can be made - a hardship case or whatever - for giving
the group in question the benefit of whatever room there may be for exemp-
tions to the general law we have enacted.
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